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Market Power has traditionally been a subject of major importance
for economics. In the nineteenth century, Antoine Augustin Cournot
and Joseph Bertrand regarded market power as an eminent issue, and
made important contributions to the development of theories of mar-
ket power. Also in the twentieth century, market power has featured
as one of the main problems in economics (Scherer and Ross
(1990)).
1 The first thing worth noticing is that market power is a com-
plex phenomenon with a variety of widely diverging related aspects.
Three types of issues are of major significance with respect to market
power: distributional effects, dynamic efficiency and allocative
efficiency. The consumer and the producer surplus are well-known
indicators of distributional effects. Research and development is a
main topic with regard to dynamic efficiency, as well as price wars,
mergers, entry and exit. Allocative efficiency is primarily related to
pricing policies and quantity-setting processes. Comparative static
analysis features prominently here.
Aim of the Study
This report discusses allocative efficiency and focuses on pricing and
quantity-setting policies. These can be considered to be the most fun-
damental aspects of market power. Perfect competition is commonly
advocated as optimal. If the price in a certain industry diverges from
marginal cost, this ideal has not been met. The quantity supplied is
sub-optimal in a situation of imperfect competition.
The Lerner index measures the divergence between price and mar-
ginal cost. This divergence is the result of both producer and con-
sumer behaviour. Hence, the Lerner index is an indicator of the result
of the market process, and is not a good measure of market power.
Instead, it is a performance measure which represents the non-com-
petitive rents that accrue to the producers. Market power is defined as
the extent to which producers collude. A collusion parameter, the con-
jectural elasticity, is used as an index of market power. This conduct
measure represents the power producers exert to raise price above
marginal cost. Producer behaviour is separated from consumer
behaviour by taking the value of the elasticity of demand into
account. Because of this, the conjectural elasticity has been called the
elasticity-adjusted Lerner index.
5
Non-competitive Rents in Dutch Manufacturing
1 See also chapters 6, 16, and 17 of the Handbook of Industrial Organization (see Bresnahan
(1989)).
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posed by Bresnahan and Appelbaum respectively – contain both the
conjectural elasticity and the Lerner index. Therefore, their applica-
tion results in information on market power as well as on the amount
of non-competitive rents. They contain both a demand equation and
a supply relation. The third model – proposed by Roeger (and
inspired by Hall) – results in an estimate of the Lerner index and only
provides information on the amount of non-competitive rents. It is a
one-equation model based on Total-Factor-Productivity calculations.
One of the first two models has been applied to Dutch manufactur-
ing (Hindriks, Nieuwenhuijsen and Van Stel 1999). The third model
is applied to Dutch manufacturing in this report.
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework for this paper is provided by the New
Empirical Industrial Organization. The name of this school within
economics has been introduced by Bresnahan (1989) and has been
used by a number of economists in the past decade.
1,2 The New
Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO from now on) consists of
models of market power and related topics.
3 Some additional features
of NEIO are (Bresnahan (1989), p.1012):
• Marginal Cost is assumed to be unobservable. Consequently, it is
either inferred from firm behaviour, or it is not measured at all.
• The industry level is the prime level of analysis. Furthermore,
‘Individual industries are taken to have important idiosyncracies.’
Institutional detail is deemed important. Cross-section regressions
of unrelated industries is seen as immaterial. Therefore, time series
or panel data are required.
• ‘Firm and industry conduct are viewed as unknown parameters to
be estimated. … [P]arameters of those equations can be directly
linked to analytical notions of firm and industry conduct.’
6
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1 Corts (1999), Nevo (1998), Bettendorf and Verboven (1997), Bhuyan and Lopez (1997),
Genesove and Mullin (1995), Shaffer (1994), and Domowitz (1992).
2 In most cases, it is fairly easy to classify articles as belonging to the New Empirical Industrial
Organization or not. The subject, the model, the data set, and especially the list of references
usually provide sufficient clues for this. For instance, a reference to Bresnahan (1989) forms
an indication to consider the relevant article as belonging to this school.
3 The most important of these are asymmetries in conduct (Roberts (1984), Spiller and Favaro
(1984), Gollop and Roberts (1979)), and product differentiation (Nevo (1998), Cubbin
(1983)). Furthermore, the phenomenon of price wars figures prominently in the NEIO (Ellison
(1994), Bresnahan (1987), Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), Porter (1985), (1983), – inspired
by Stigler (1964) -, Green and Porter (1984), Lee and Porter (1984)).
Dutch Manufacturing  27-09-1999  10:23  Pagina 6The NEIO is different from the Structure-Conduct-Performance
Paradigm (cf. Bresnahan (1989), pp.1012-13), as may be clear from
some of the features mentioned.
1 The NEIO literature has not
addressed the link between structure and conduct or the link between
structure and performance.
2 These links have been popular within the
SCP-Paradigm. However, it turned out to be difficult to find a robust
relationship between market structure and market conduct, or market
performance. The main focus has been on concentration indices.
However, Slade ((1986), p.348), for one, concludes from her empiri-
cal results: ‘[M]arket share, the traditional focus of industrial-organi-
zation studies, is not an important determinant of conjectures or of
Lerner indices in this industry’
3 (cf. also Bresnahan (1989), p.1043).
The theory of contestability, formulated in the early eighties (Baumol
et al. (1988 [1982])) offers an explanation of competitive behaviour in
concentrated markets. Because of this lack of interest in structure, the
NEIO has been regarded as a school that focuses on the link between
conduct and performance. For instance, Shaffer (1994) states: ‘Thus,
with the linkage between structure and conduct itself in doubt, actu-
al conduct and performance remain empirical issues.’ (3)
4 This seems
to be a characterization which fits NEIO well.
The models within NEIO can be distinguished in two main cate-
gories. The first contains models that are used to test specific
hypotheses, e.g. whether perfect competition or monopoly is present.
The second category consists of models that provide indices of the
divergence between price and marginal cost. Within this second cat-
egory, two indices can be distinguished: the first is the conjectural
elasticity, which represents the amount of market power, whereas the
7
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1 The broader movement of New industrial Organization ‘is often described as having undergone
a renaissance. It is much more accurate to say that it has undergone a reformation. It has a
firmer theoretical foundation and aspires to greater precision. But, with one exception, it is
a development and extrension of received work, not a clean break with the past.’ (Martin
1994, p.556)
2 Shaffer (1983) sees Bresnahan (1982), Iwata (1974), and Rosse and Panzar (1977) as alter-
natives to the SCP approach to measuring market power. These papers are within the bound-
aries of the NEIO as they have been determined by Bresnahan (1989). In Shaffer (1982,
p.167) it is said that ‘competition is actually a property of conduct rather than structure.’ This
shows that the difference from the SCP-paradigm was noted in the early eighties already. See
Shaffer (1994) for a more elaborate discussion of these issues.
3 It must, however, be noted that Slade (1986, p.348) finds other aspects of structure, e.g. type
of ownership and degree of vertical integration, ‘have significant explanatory power.’
Furthermore, a remarkable relationship between market share and consumer (!) behavior is
found: ‘Market share is a significant determinant of consumer attitudes. That is, consumers
are more loyal to stations owned by firms with large market shares. In contrast, market share
does not explain seller behavior.’ (p.365)
4 Market structure is not in principle excluded from the domain of the NEIO. Bresnahan (1989)
regards the comparative statistics in industry structure as a potential source of identification
of market power. However, he states: ‘This area is, I believe, awaiting its identification argu-
ments’ (1032) When aspects of market structure are modelled within the NEIO, they must be
endogenized. It must be clear under which circumstances there is a direct relationship
between market structure, e.g. concentration, and conduct and/or performance. Disturbing
influences, that disrupt this relationship, should be made explicit, at least to some extent.
One of the first attempts to do this is Allen (1998).
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sure of non-competitive rents. Non-competitive rents are a result of
market power (cf. chapter 2). These models can be used to to rank
industries with respect to the amount of market power and/or of non-
competitive rents. This enables an assessment of the relative market
power and/or the relative amount of non-competitive rents. This
report focusses on this second category.
Policy Relevance and Empirical Research
Market Power is not only important from a theoretical point of view.
The issue is important for policy as well. This can be seen from sev-
eral publications of the OECD. For instance, in OECD (1997) the
potential impacts of regulatory reform are assessed. It is said that:
‘Cross-country and cross-sectoral differences in productivity, prices,
wages, and profit margins are assumed to be partly related to regula-
tory barriers, which implies that such differences can be reduced if
appropriate regulatory reforms are introduced.’ (9) The policy rele-
vance provides an important incentive for empirical applications of
models of market power. A prime example of this is Oliveira Martins
et al. (1996), which provides a comparative study of aspects of mar-
ket power in some of the OECD countries.
In the Netherlands, market power has been an important issue since
the early nineties. In the eighties, competition and market power
have hardly played any role, especially in applied research (Van Dijk
and Van Bergeijk (1997), Haffner and Van Bergeijk (1997)). In 1993,
the OECD payed some attention to Dutch competition policies in the
Economic Survey of the Netherlands of 1992-1993. This survey was
discussed in the ESB, a Dutch journal read by many economists and
policy-makers alike (Van Walderveen (1993), and Van Gent (1993)).
This Economic Survey and the dissemination of the critique of the
OECD have prompted a surge in research. By now, a variety of arti-
cles on market power in the Netherlands has been published (see for
a survey and a classification of quantitative studies on the
Netherlands Van Dijk and Van Bergeijk (1997)).
In 1994, the Dutch government started operation MDW (Markt-
werking, Deregulering, en Wetgevingskwaliteit), which pays atten-
tion to competition, deregulation, and quality of legislation. This pro-
ject is currently in its second phase, and the first phase has resulted
in some changes by now, although more positive consequences are
expected (Haffner and Van Hulst 1998). Only in January 1998 the
advice of the OECD to create an independent agency that controls
mergers and acquisitions (OECD 1993: 86) has been put into practice
8
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Mededingsautoriteit).
In the Netherlands, EIM was among the first institutes which recog-
nized the importance of research with respect to competition and
market power. Prince and Thurik ((1990), (1991), and (1992)) and
Lever ((1997a), and (1997b)) addressed the impact of market struc-
ture on product prices, Kleijweg (1993) and Kleijweg and
Nieuwenhuijsen (1996) investigated the determinants of the persis-
tence of profits, Lever and Nieuwenhuijsen (1998) studied the impact
of competition on productivity, Kleijweg and Lever (1996), Carree,
Fris and Thurik (1993) and Carree and Thurik ((1994), (1995), and
(1996)) studied the process of entry and exit of firms and Lever and
Marquering (1996) considered the impact of mandatory extension on
wages and employment. Eggenkamp (1997) and Lever, Nieuwen-
huijsen and Van Stel (1999) investigated the impact of conduct on
performance. The key issues in the latter two reports are collusive
behaviour and the exercise of market power. The current report
addresses similar questions as these latter two papers.
Structure of the Report
Chapter 2 discusses a general oligopoly power and provides the back-
ground for interpreting the three models discussed in the subsequent
chapters. The first two models – that contain both the conjectural
elasticity and the Lerner index – are discussed in chapter 3. The third
model – that results in an estimate of the Lerner index – is discussed
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The most important characteristic of an oligopoly is the fact that the
firms in an oligopolistic industry interact strategically with each other.
This means that the behaviour of one firm is influenced by the behav-
iour of the other firms in the same industry. The extent to which this
is the case can be measured in terms of the conjectural elasticity. The
conjectural elasticity can be seen as a conduct parameter and it can
be used to investigate apparent collusion, i.e. collusion between firms
as can be inferred from the actual behaviour of these firms. In line
with this, the conjectural elasticity has become known as the “coeffi-
cient of cooperation” (Geroski (1988)).
A significant result of oligopoly behaviour is a price which exceeds
marginal cost. This can be measured in terms of a markup, such as
the Lerner index. The markup is a key indicator of market perfor-
mance. This markup is the result of both producer and consumer
behaviour. This is not only the case conceptually, but it follows from
the mathematical representation of the oligopoly model as well.
Supply and Demand
Assume an industry demand curve according to which price is relat-
ed to quantity supplied:
(1)
Q represents quantity supplied by the industry as a whole and P is
price.
Furthermore, assume that each firm maximizes its profits. This




i denotes marginal revenue as perceived by firm i. This may be
different from marginal revenue for the industry as a whole, which
would be relevant for a monopolist and for firms operating as a full
cartel. Marginal revenue for the industry as a whole (and for a
monopolist) follows when the derivative of P · qi, i.e. total revenue,
is taken with respect to Q. Marginal revenue as perceived by firm i
equals the derivative of the revenue of firm i, i.e. P · qi, with respect
to qi. This (potential)
1 difference between marginal revenue of an
industry as a whole and perceived marginal revenue is a consequence
of the fact that firms in an industry are interdependent. The firms,
11
Non-competitive Rents in Dutch Manufacturing
1 In case of a monopoly or a full cartel there is no difference.
Dutch Manufacturing  27-09-1999  10:23  Pagina 11which together constitute an industry, have an incentive to co-orpo-
rate as a group, whereas each individual firm has an incentive to
deviate from a (possibly implicit) agreement to co-operate. Therefore,
the perceived marginal revenue and its divergence from marginal rev-
enue at the industry level are important for determining the degree of
market power.
Whereas marginal revenue for an industry as a whole equals
,
marginal revenue as perceived by an individual firm equals
(qi is quantity produced by firm i), which is less than marginal
revenue for the industry as a whole, as long as there is more than one
firm in the industry which maximizes its own profit, while taking into
consideration the behaviour of competitors which do not (fully)
cooperate as to maximize joint profits.
Equation 2 can now be rewritten:
(3)
which can be rewritten in terms of price:
(4)
This equation is a supply relation, since it relates price to marginal
cost and represents conduct by means of the conjectural variation,
(cf. below). It shows that the price firm i receives for its product,
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When this equation is rearranged in yet another way and both sides
are divided by the price, equation 5 results:
(5)
.
The left-hand side of equation 4 equals the Lerner index, L, which is
a relative markup or a price-cost margin. The right-hand side is the
product of the absolute inverse elasticity of demand, i.e. 
and the as of yet undefined conjectural elasticity qi. The conjectural
elasticity of firm i, qi, the conjectural variation, gi, of firm i with the
market share, Si, of that firm. The conjectural variation embodies the
direct effect of a change in output by firm i, which is 1 by definition,
and an indirect effect, which is the influence of the change in output
by firm i on the output decisions of other firms. The conjectural elas-
ticity then is defined and can be decomposed as follows:
(6)
.
The conjectural elasticity depicts the conduct of producers and is a
key measure of market power.
The definition of the conjectural elasticity in terms of the conjectural
variation and the market share, as presented in (6), is commonly
related to the idea that this elasticity is a weighted measure of the
expectation of firm i about the behaviour of its competitors. The con-
jectural variation represents the expectation, which is weighted by
the market share (Iwata (1974), Bresnahan (1989)). This is a more
substantial interpretation than that which sees the conjectural elas-
ticity as a coefficient of cooperation, since the latter interpretation
does not specify what this elasticity consists of. Many economists are
critical of the interpretation which claims that the actual expectations
of firms are modeled in the supply relation of the oligopoly model,
mostly because of game-theoretic arguments (Geroski (1988)), and
prefer an “as if” interpretation (Boyer (1996), p.116), which does not
analyse the elasticity beyond the claim that it is a measure of collu-
sion. This line is also followed in this paper, so the conjectural elas-
ticity is seen as a variable that represents conduct and is to be seen




1 Krouse (1998, p.688), who is even more critical of the notion of a conjectural variation, pro-
poses to refer to the conjectural elasticity as an equilibrium solution parameter (ESP). Corts
(1999), who also supports an “as if” interpretation (p.228 and passim) sees the conjectural
elasticity as “the elasticity adjusted Lerner index” (p.231). More is said on this interpretation
below.
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conjectural elasticity and the Lerner index, equation 7 results:
1
(7)
The Lerner index, therefore, equals the ratio of the conjectural elas-
ticity of firm i and the (absolute) elasticity of demand. From this
equation it can be seen that the conjectural elasticity is the product
of the Lerner index and the (absolute) elasticity of demand. Since the
elasticity of demand depicts consumer behaviour and the conduct
parameter, i.e. the conjectural elasticity, represents the behaviour of
producers, it follows that the Lerner index is a performance indicator
which measures the result of the market process as a whole, as was
stated in the second paragraph of this section.
Range of values for the conjectural elasticity
The conjectural elasticity equals 0 when competition is perfect and 1
in case of a monopoly. This follows from the values of the elements
of the conjectural elasticity, i.e. from the values of the market share
and the conjectural variation (cf. (6)). In a situation where all firms
have the same size, the market share, Si, equals the reciprocal of n,
the number of firms. n is indefinitely high in case of perfect compe-
tition and equal to one in case of a monopoly. This implies a market
share of 0 in the former case and a market share of 1 in the latter. The
conjectural variation, gi, equals 0 in case of perfect competition and
1 in case of a monopoly. This implies that both elements of the con-
jectural elasticity equal 0 in case of perfect competition, whereas they
equal 1 when the market is dominated by a monopoly. These values
of the two elements imply, in turn, the respective values of the con-
jectural elasticity mentioned above.
An interesting case is that of a full cartel. The behaviour of a monop-
oly and of a full cartel is identical. However, the market share of a
firm which is part of the cartel does not equal 1, since there is more
than one firm in the industry. Furthermore, the conjectural variation
14
The Oligopoly Model
1 An alternative formulation of (4) can be given, which will turn out to be relevant in chapter
3 when the model proposed by Appelbaum (1982) is discussed. In terms of the variables that
have just been defined, price equals the ratio of marginal cost and 1 plus the ratio of the con-
jectural elasticity and the elasticity of demand:
This follows from
which results when (4) is divided by price.
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to match its (change in) output. The effect of a decrease in output by
firm i by x, results in a decrease in total output supplied by the indus-
try of nx. Therefore, the conjectural variation of a full cartel equals
the number of firms: gi = 1+(n – 1) = n. The product of the market
share and the conjectural variation still equals 1, just as in a monop-
oly situation.
In a Cournot oligopoly, the market share equals 1/n. Firms are sup-
posed not to react to changes in behaviour of competitors. This
implies that their conjecture is that a(n) increase (decrease) in output
by firm i will not result in a decrease or increase in the quantity sup-
plied by other firms. In absence of reactions of competitors, the effect
of a change in behaviour of firm i will be the same at the level of the
firm as at the level of the industry as a whole. Therefore, the conjec-
tural variation equals 1 in such a situation, whereas
.
From this it follows that the conjectural elasticity equals 1/n when
actual behaviour matches that of a (symmetrical) Cournot oligopoly.
(Range of values for) the Lerner index and the elasticities of
demand
(5) can be rewritten in yet another way. The right-hand side of this
equation equals the reciprocal of the (absolute) elasticity as perceived
by the firm:
(8)
This follows from equation 5 – deleting the ratio Q/Q from the right-
hand side (which is harmless since this equals 1) – and the following
equality:
(i.e. the product of the derivative of price with respect to (total) quan-
tity and the derivative of total quantity with respect to the quantity of
firm i equals the derivative of price with respect to the quantity of
firm i). Thus, the right-hand side of equation 5 boils down to: 
15
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demand,  ei, equals minus infinity, –µ, since a small increase in price
by a firm i results in zero demand for that firm (ceteris paribus). The
associated value of the Lerner index is 0. The Lerner index equals 1
when the perceived elasticity of demand equals –1 or when price is
indefinitely larger than marginal cost (or marginal cost equals 0).
When the (absolute) perceived elasticity is larger than 1, the Lerner
index is smaller than 1.
From these considerations, together with the fact that the (absolute)
perceived elasticity of demand is smaller than or equal to the elastic-
ity of demand,
1 it can be concluded that the upper limit of possible
values of the Lerner index is the minimum of –1/e and 1. When the
former restriction is binding, it can be concluded that the actual
Lerner index is smaller than –1/e, since the (absolute) elasticity of
demand can only be smaller than 1 in an oligopoly situation (the per-
ceived elasticity of demand and the elasticity at the industry level are
not equal to each other in case of an oligopoly).
2 When industry
behaviour cannot be characterized as a monopoly – or a full cartel for
that matter – the perceived elasticity of demand deviates from the
elasticity of demand for the industry as a whole.
From this analysis, it follows that a positive value of the Lerner index
does not have a clear interpretation. A Lerner index of 1 does not nec-
essarily imply that the industry under consideration should be char-
acterized as a monopoly, nor does a value different from 1 imply that
there is no monopoly. The reason for this is that the Lerner index is
a measure which combines two dimensions. The price-cost margin is
the result of the market process as determined by both producer and
consumer behaviour.
Interpreting the conjectural elasticity
In contrast, the conjectural elasticity depicts only one element of the
market process: producer behaviour. This index does have a clear
interpretation. A value of 0 implies a situation of perfect competition,
whereas a value of 1 implies (full) monopoly power. Intermediate
16
The Oligopoly Model
1 This follows from what has been said about the divergence between marginal revenue and
perceived marginal revenue, and is elaborated upon below.
2 The elasticity of demand faced by a monopolist is smaller than or equal to -1 (Hindriks (1999),
p.25), or, alternatively, the absolute inverse elasticity of demand is between zero and one
(Appelbaum (1982), p.293). The general definition of the Lerner index as price minus mar-
ginal cost divided by price implies that the index cannot be larger than 1. Equation (8) implies
that the Lerner index is smaller than the absolute reciprocal of the elasticity of demand, which
is smaller than 1 as in case of a monopoly as well as for a range of oligopoly situations. A
value of the reciprocal of the absolute elasticity of demand smaller than 1, say 0.75, implies
that the Lerner index is smaller than 1 as well. In case of the example, it implies that the
Lerner index is smaller than or equal to 0.75.
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1
The equivalent number of firms is defined as the number of firms
which is consistent with the value of the conjectural elasticity, when
it is assumed that this value represents a Cournot oligopoly. In other
words, it is the number of firms which a Cournot oligopoly would
sustain given the value of the conjectural elasticity. This equivalent
number of firms can serve as a benchmark figure, which is to be com-
pared with the actual number of firms present in the industry. When
the actual number is greater than the equivalent number as indicat-
ed by the conjectural elasticity, market power is larger than in a
Cournot oligopoly. As has been noted in the introduction, a Cournot
oligopoly represents a situation in which a fairly low degree of mar-
ket power is present. If the actual degree of market power in a par-
ticular industry is larger than in a Cournot-situation, the market
power is high enough to be relevant from the perspective of anti-trust
policy.
For example, when the estimated value of the conjectural elasticity of
a certain firm or industry equals 0.25, Cournot behaviour would
imply n = 4, i.e. the industry contains four firms. This follows from
the fact that in a Cournot oligopoly the conjectural elasticity equals
1/n (cf. above). When, however, the industry comprises five firms
instead, it can be concluded that behaviour is more collusive than in
a Cournot oligopoly, which implies that the degree of market power
in that industry is greater than in a Cournot situation.
The economic intuition behind this index can be elucidated by rewrit-
ing the elasticity in terms of the elasticity of demand and the per-




This equation implies that the elasticity of demand equals the prod-
uct of the conjectural elasticity and the perceived elasticity of a firm:
e = eiqi. (It does not matter which firm – even in an asymmetrical
situation –, since a perceived elasticity of demand which deviates
from the average implies a conjectural elasticity which deviates from
the average as well.) Since the conjectural elasticity of a monopolist
equals 1, it follows that the perceived elasticity of demand and the
actual elasticity of demand coincide in case of a monopoly.
17
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1 This interpretation was suggested by Sullivan (1985).
2 Cf. Hindriks (1998, p.8).
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the well-known fact that there may be a difference between the
responsiveness of consumers to price changes by one firm and price
changes by all firms in an industry. If only one firm changes its price,
consumers can purchase the product in question from another firm
for the old price. The effect of the price change for the one firm may
be much larger than that for the industry as a whole. In general, it
can be said that the responsiveness of consumers to price changes by
one firm is larger (or equal to) price changes in the industry as a
whole. What emerges from this picture is that the (absolute) elastic-
ity of demand for the industry as a whole is smaller than or equal to
the (absolute) perceived elasticity of demand, which in turn is small-
er than or equal to infinity: –e ≤ –ei ≤ ¥.
From this in combination with (7) and (9), it can be concluded that
the conjectural elasticity is always smaller than the (absolute) elas-
ticity of demand: q ≤ –e. Only when the (absolute) elasticity of
demand is smaller than 1, however, is this restriction binding. This
cannot occur in case of a monopoly. Therefore, it can be concluded
that an absolute value of the elasticity of demand smaller than 1
implies an oligopoly situation with an associated value for the con-




When equation 7 is aggregated over all the firms in the industry in
terms of the Lerner index and the conjectural elasticity, both at the
industry level, equation 10 results:
(10)
Both the Lerner index and the conjectural elasticity at the industry
level are weighted averages, the weights being the market shares of
the firms in the industry. Since the sum of the market shares equals
1 – in a symmetrical situation:
the values of the conjectural elasticity and the Lerner index at the
industry level are to be interpreted in the same way as those at the
level of the individual firm, i.e. a conjectural elasticity of 0 or 1 still
18
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1 This is not to say that the (absolute) elasticity of demand is necessarily smaller than 1 in
case of an oligopoly. A value larger than 1 is consistent both with a monopoly and an
oligopoly situation.
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ever be kept in mind that the variables at the industry level represent
averages. An important consequence is that when the industry level
value of the conjectural elasticity implies a high (low) degree of
market power, it can be the case that some individual firms in this
particular industry only have a low (high) degree of market power.
Market Power and Non-competitive Rents
In this report the conjectural elasticity is seen as an index of market
power. The full argument for this can now be presented. The conjec-
tural elasticity depicts one dimension of the market process: the
behaviour of producers. Because of this, the conjectural elasticity is a
conduct measure. Power is intrinsically related to behaviour.
Furthermore, monopoly power is often used as a synonym for mar-
ket power, while the term oligopoly power is used as well.
1 Both the
term monopoly and the term oligopoly indicate that reference is
being made to (a) producer(s). Therefore, it seems natural to say that
market power is the power which is exerted by the producers over the
consumers. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the conjec-
tural elasticity is an index of market power.
2
The Lerner index represents the combined effect of both producer
and consumer behaviour. As such, the Lerner index, which is a price-
cost margin, can be said to be the result of the market process. This
result depicts the performance of the firms in the industry, since the
price-cost margin is an indicator of economic profit.
3 Because of this,
the Lerner index has become to be known as a measure of non-com-
petitive rents.
It is important to realize that when a set of industries is arranged
according to the degree of market power as represented by the value
of the conjectural elasticity, the resulting ordering may be different
from that which would result when the set of industries was ranked
according to their relative non-competitive rents. The reason for this
is the fact that the elasticity of demand may be different for different
industries. The conjectural elasticity takes the elasticity of demand
into account (cf. eq. 7). This is why the conjectural elasticity has also
19
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1 Among other things, this can be seen from (the titles of) the following papers: Cairns (1996),
(1995), Geroski (1988), and Sumner (1981) for monopoly power; Bhuyan and Lopez (1997),
and Lopez (1984) for oligopoly power.
2 Shapiro (1987a) and Genesove and Mullin (1998) see the conjectural elasticity as a measure
of market power as well. In contrast, Hall (1987), for example, defines market power in terms
of the value of a mark-up.
3 The Lerner index is especially suited as an indicator of the economic profit of a certain firm
or industry when there are no fixed costs, since the Lerner index only takes variable costs into
account.
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(1999), p.231; Genesove and Mullin (1998) p.356)
1.
Performance and Welfare
The Lerner index as a measure of performance can be related to a
commonly known measure of static welfare loss, the Harberger tri-
angle (W
H). Van Dijk and Van Bergeijk (1997) show that under fairly
restrictive assumptions (i.e. a horizontal marginal cost function and
a linear downward-sloping demand curve) the deadweight loss can
be expressed as percentage of revenues:
(11)
m is a markup and is defined as price over marginal cost. The welfare
effects of a positive Lerner index can be calculated directly using this
equation. This represents a relative measure of alocative inefficiency.
The assumptions may not be as restrictive as they seem, since they
may hold close to the competitive equilibrium. The formula can be
used as a local estimate of the static welfare loss (cf. Shaffer (1993),
pp.51-52 for ‘local estimate’ with regard to the conjectural elasticity).
If it is believed that the assumptions only hold close to the competi-
tive equilibrium, the deviation from perfect competition as measured




1 The oligopoly model of this chapter can be extended in a variety of ways, e.g. to include prod-
uct differentiation or asymmetries in behavior. The latter extension is elaborated upon in
annex II of Hindriks (1999).
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3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, a general oligopoly model was presented in
order to determine the relationship between the conjectural elasticity
and the Lerner index, i.e. the relationship between market power
(producer behaviour) and non-competitive rents (the outcome of the
market process). The models presented in this chapter are extensions
of the general oligopoly model. Exogenous variables are introduced
and the equations are specified in order to turn the general model into
models that can be applied empirically.
Section 3.2 discusses the model proposed by Bresnahan (1982), who
uses comparative statistics of demand to identify the conjectural elas-
ticity and the Lerner index. The model of section 3.3, proposed by
Appelbaum (1982), relies on estimation of marginal cost for deter-
mining the amount of market power and of non-competitive rents.
This second model includes not only a demand function and a supply
relation, but includes factor demand equations as well.
3.2 Bresnahan and Comparative Statistics
in Demand
Bresnahan (1982) presents some general conditions, satisfaction of
which guarantees that the equations for supply and demand are iden-
tified. He shows that ‘the comparative statics of equilibrium, as price
and quantity are moved by exogenous variables, reveal the degree of
market power.’ (p.87) If nothing is known about the structure of the
functions beforehand, it is necessary to include both a variable that
shifts and a variable that rotates the demand curve in the equation
for demand in order to establish identification. In general some mea-
sure of national income is used as a shift variable, whereas the price
of a substitute is used as a variable that is taken to rotate the demand
curve over time. Using Y to denote the shift variable and Z to denote
the rotation variable, the following expression for the demand curve
ensues:
(1)
The supply relation is formulated as follows:
(2)
21
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K represent labour, material, and capital respectively. h(Q, Y, Z), as it
represents the inverse semi-elasticity
is implicit in the demand equation. q is identified.
1
This approach is based on the fact that the supply relation may
change when the (semi)elasticity of demand changes, whereas the
marginal cost function does not. Key to the understanding of the
method used is the interpretation of the conjectural elasticity as the
ratio of the elasticity of demand for an industry to the elasticity of
demand faced by an individual firm (chapter 2 equation (9)), where
the latter can alternatively be seen as a “representative firm” or as an
average firm, notions that are obviously connected.
As noted above, two additional variables, Y and Z, have to be added
in order to achieve identification (1). This is needed in order to be
able to discriminate between different types of conduct. Furthermore,
the specification of the model in which they appear needs to meet
certain demands (2). Both these conditions will be commented upon
in this section.
(1) In a situation of perfect competition as well as in a monopoly, the
supply relationship at the industry level slopes upward and the
demand curve slopes down. Depending on the exact shape of the
marginal cost curve, the supply relation of an industry in a situation
of perfect competition may coincide with the supply curve of a
monopoly. In order to be able to discriminate between these two
cases, it is necessary to add both a variable which shifts the demand
curve and a variable which rotates the demand curve. This is illus-
trated in figures A and B.
If overall demand increases, for instance because of an increase in the
gross national product, the demand curve shifts outward in a parallel
way. At any quantity supplied the price will increase, both in case of
perfect competition and monopoly. It is possible for the price increase
to be equal in both cases, depending on the shape of the marginal
cost curve. This is the case if the supply curve in a situation of per-
fect competition is identical to the supply relation of a monopoly, as
in figure A.
22
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1 Equation (2) follows from chapter 2 equation (10). This can be seen by substituting the equa-
tion (L = –q/e) in P = MC +P · L, which follows from the definition of the Lerner index.
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monopoly. When the demand curve shifts, it may happen that the
new equilibria of perfect competition and monopoly coincide again,
cf. E2. In that case, both the supply curve of perfect competition and
the supply relation of the monopoly coincide with the marginal cost
curve of perfect competition (MC
pc).
Figure 3.A Shift of the Demand Curve
This problem can be solved by adding the price of a substitute as an
extra variable. A change in the price of a substitute of the relevant
product rotates the demand curve, for instance through the original
equilibrium. When both changes in GNP (or another shift variable)
and changes in the price of a substitute are taken into account, the
demand curve will both shift and rotate over time. By looking at both
these changes, it will be possible to see a difference between the two
cases. For instance, if the demand curve becomes less steep, it may
be that the price stays the same in the case of perfect competition (the
demand curve rotates through the equilibrium), whereas it becomes
lower in the case of a monopoly because of a change in the supply
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to distinguish a situation of perfect competition from that of a monop-
oly. E2 remains the equilibrium for the case of perfect competition.
However, E3m becomes the new equilibrium for the monopoly.
Figure 3.B Rotation of the Demand Curve
(2) The second condition pertains to the way these additional two
variables are specified in the model. The price of a substitute cannot
be included in just any way. In particular, it cannot be included as an
additive factor, since the demand curve would not rotate because of
a change in a variable which is modeled in an additive way. For the
proof of this condition and of some others I refer to Lau (1982). The
content of the conditions proofed by Lau is summarized in Carlton
and Perloff (1994, p.377, n2): ‘Lau (1982) shows that virtually any
functional form for the demand curve leads to identifications except
the two most commonly used forms: linear or log-linear. If one wants
to use a basically linear specification, one must add an interaction
term, a squared term in output, or something else that adds some
nonlinearity and allows the demand curve to rotate.’ In the model as
proposed in Bresnahan (1982) the price of the substitute enters inter-
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with equation 3 representing a demand equation, while equation 4
depicts the supply relation. A direct estimate of the conjectural elas-
ticity results from the application of this system of equations. The
elasticity of demand can be calculated using the estimate of the deriv-
ative of equation 3 to price, whereas the Lerner index has to be
inferred from the estimates of the supply relation.
If features of the demand or cost structure of the industry under con-
sideration are known beforehand, more structure can be imposed on
the system of equations than in the model of equations 3 and 4. For
instance, if one knows marginal cost to be constant, i.e. b1 = 0, the
conjectural elasticity can be identified without including a variable
that rotates the demand curve, i.e. a3 = 0 and a4 = 0 (Carlton and
Perloff 1994, p.379; cf. Bettendorf and Verboven 1997). A shift-vari-
able should still be included.
3.3 Appelbaum and the Estimation of
Marginal Cost
When marginal cost is estimated in order to identify the degree of
market power in a parametric approach, it does not suffice to esti-
mate only a demand curve and a supply relation. Apart from those,
it is necessary to estimate input demand functions as well.
The demand curve can be formulated as follows:
(5)
As can be seen from this representation, a variable that rotates the
demand curve is not necessary in this identification procedure. The
identification of the supply relation is partly achieved by variables
included in the demand equation and partly by the estimation of the
25
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1 It is not mandatory to include both Y and Z as additive variables. The interaction term a3PZ
ensures the rotation of the demand curve, whereas both a2Y and a4Z shift the demand curve.
Bresnahan starts with a ‘typical demand function’ that includes Y.’ (1982, p.88) He then shows
the need for including Z, states that ‘they [sic] key feature is that Z enters interactively with
P’ (91), and includes Z both interactively and additive. The latter is not necessary. However,
it may improve the explanatory power of the equation.
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demand equation are therefore less strict.
Marginal cost depends on the price of inputs:
(6) MC = MC(wj).
The supply curve contains both the marginal cost and the markup
component:
(7)
In order to identify the equations and the variables of this model by
estimating marginal cost, input demand functions have to be formu-
lated. Starting from a cost function, demand equations for inputs
have to be derived using Shephard’s lemma. Wj denotes the inputs
and, as noted earlier, wj denotes the price of these inputs, where j =
{N, M, K} and K, N, M represent capital, labour, and material respec-
tively. Some of the parameters of these input demand functions
should equal other parameters of the marginal cost component of the
supply relation, which provides the restrictions needed.
The general form of the input demand functions is:
(8)
The subscript R denotes one of the inputs labour, material, or capi-
tal. The same holds for S1 and S2. R denotes the input for which the
equation is a demand equation. S1 and S2 represent the other two
inputs.
The basis for identification in this approach is the fact that the con-
jectural elasticity, together with the (semi)elasticity of demand is a
measure of the difference between the marginal cost function and the
supply relation. The natural interpretation connected to this follows
from the expression of the supply relation, which after some
rearrangement can be represented as: q = (P – MC) · h(·).
Appelbaum (1982) uses a generalized Leontief cost function:
(9)
C is total cost and is dependent on the prices of the inputs and the
quantity supplied.
26
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Appelbaum (1982, p.291) concludes that ‘marginal costs are constant
and equal across firms.’ The cost function hardly allows variation in
technology between firms. Furthermore, changes in technology over
time have not been accounted for. The former limitation is problem-
atic when firms within an industry are too heterogeneous. When a
higher level of aggregation is chosen, the three-digit industries may
be too heterogeneous to justify their aggregation in one two-digit
industry for purposes of the estimation of this model.
Differentiating equation 9 with respect to quantity produced results
in marginal cost:
(10)




The input demand equations can be derived from the Leontief cost




Since the cost function is the fundamental equation for both margin-
al cost and the input demand equations, these equations have some
of their parameters in common. The parameters that figure in more
than one equation should be identical. This provides for so-called
cross-equation restrictions. These cross-equation restrictions together
with the exogeneous variables lead to the identification of the model.
Appelbaum (1982) chooses a log-linear specification of the demand
equation:
(15)
with price and GNP deflated by a price index PI.
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1 Equation (9) follows from equation (10) of chapter 2, just as equation (2) and (7). However,
q enters multiplicatively in this equation, while it enters additively in (2). This is due to the
fact that (9) contains the elasticity, whereas (2 contains the semi-elasticity of demand (cf.
p.10n2).
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Hindriks, Nieuwenhuijsen, and Van Stel (1999) present 9 boundary
conditions that the estimated model should satisfy. They apply the
model to Dutch manufacturing, and check the conditions as well. For
several industries, the restrictions these basic boundary conditions
have to satisfy – such as a negative elasticity of demand – fail with-
out obvious reasons. Because of the fact that the estimation of the
elasticity of demand is a main source of problems, experimenting
with this – e.g. using instrumental variables – may be a way to
achieve better results.
Disappointing results may reflect what is both the main advantage
and disadvantage of the models discussed in this section. Hyde and
Perloff comment on this type of models: ‘If correctly specified, it is
the most powerful approach.’ (1995, p.467) However, it may not be
known what the correct specification of the model with respect to a
certain industry is, and the results are quite sensitive to the specifi-
cation that is used.
1
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1 Cf. Corts (1999), Krouse (1998), Cairns (1996), and Boyer (1996) for other comments on this
type of models. Hyde and Perloff (1995) discuss the model proposed by Hall – to be discussed
in the next chapter – as well. The use of industry detail is generally encouraged as a way to
solve some of the problems that arise in applying this type of models (cf. chapter 1).
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4.1 Introduction
The link between the model(s) in this chapter and the general
oligopoly model of chapter 2 is not as direct as in the case of the
models proposed by Bresnahan and Appelbaum. The Roeger model
does not include a demand function and, consequently, it does not
result in an estimate of the conjectural elasticity. However, the equa-
tion that is to be estimated can be seen as a supply relation, since, in
a way, it relates price to marginal cost. An estimate of the non-com-
petitive rents results from applying the model.
The next section discusses the derivation of the basic equation.
Section 4.3 discusses the use of value added data instead of gross out-
put data and the potentially cyclical behaviour of the markup.
4.2 Roeger’s Basic Equation
Roeger assumes that the returns to scale are constant. This means
that marginal cost equals average cost (AC):
(1)
It can now be shown that total revenue is equal to the product of the
total cost C and the markup m (defined as price over marginal cost):
(2)
.
From (2) it is possible to derive (see Annex I):
(3)
with
factor shares of revenue.
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(4)
where
and the notation used is:
Adding an error term to (4) gives the estimating equation proposed
by Roeger (1995).
1
A nice feature of (4) is that the equation is semi-parametric. Both ∆ y
and ∆ x can be calculated from the data. No parameters have to be
estimated to construct these variables. No specific production or cost
function is presupposed in the derivation. The only assumptions
made are (i) cost minimization (ii) firms are price takers on factor
markets, and (iii) constant returns to scale. After the non-parametric
construction of Dy and Dx, L can be estimated using OLS (correcting
for heteroskedasticity).
4.3 Value Added Data and Cyclical Effects
Material
In a lot of research, value-added data are used. The reason for doing
this is the availability of data. Many data sources (e.g. national
accounts) only report value-added data. However, excluding materi-
als from the estimation equation(s) may lead to a bias in the result-
ing estimates. In general, estimates of the markup based on value-
added data are overstatements of the real markup. The extent to
which the markup is overstated depends on the correlation of mate-
rials and output. Only when the growth of materials as inputs is
uncorrelated with the growth of output, the value-added based esti-
mate does not involve an overstatement. When materials and output
grow in strict proportion to each other, it is possible to give a simple
formula for this overstatement. Denoting the value added markup by
µ*, the following expression holds in case of strict proportionality




1 Roeger’s method is an improvement over that of Hall (1988). Hall bases his approach on the
(primal) Solow residual and assumes that technical change is constant over the business
cycle. His method requires the use of instrumental variables of which Roeger says that they
‘are very hard to select.’ (1995, p.318) Roeger’s method can be derived by subtracting the dual
Solow residual from the primal (Hindriks (1999)). Technical change drops out of this equation;
hence no assumption of constancy is required and instrumental variables are not needed.
2 It is assumed that the firm is a price-taker in its markets for materials. If this is not the case,
µ* understates the true value of the mark-up. (Hall 1986, p.294)
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In case of the Lerner index, the relationship is as follows (Shapiro
1987a: 56):
(6)
Equation (6) is just a reformulation of (5) in terms of the Lerner
index. (Cf. on this subject also Norrbin 1993: 1152 and Roeger 1995:
325, n6.)
Whether these expressions can be used to translate a value-added
based estimate in its production-based analogue is a contingent mat-
ter, depending on the correlation between output growth and the
growth of use of intermediate inputs. This correlation, however, can-
not be established when data on intermediate outputs are not avail-
able. Although there is no consensus on the matter (Norrbin (1993)
being one of the disputants), adding materials and other intermedi-
ate inputs is usually considered to be quite important (Domowitz et
al. (1988, p.55), and Oliveira Martins et al. (1996, p.75)). The latter
support this by arguing for the plausibility of their production-based
estimates because they are in line with the ones generally found in
the New Empirical Industrial Organization (Oliveira Martins et al.
(1996, p.84)).
Constancy of the Lerner index
Both Hall and Roeger estimate the markup as a constant over time.
They have been criticized for this by others, and alternatives have
been proposed. The extent to which it is important whether the
markup is estimated as a constant or not, however, is debatable. The
estimate based on this assumption can be interpreted as an average
over time (Hall (1987, p.432)). One of the effects of not taking cycli-
cality into account may be a variance which is relatively high.
Oliveira Martins et al. (1996, p.92) conclude from their investigation
of cyclicality that estimates of the markup as a constant ‘can be con-
sidered as a good approximation of the average, though variable,
mark-up.’ Still, the alternatives may reveal something about the cycli-
cality of the markup, and, if the markup turns out to be cyclical, it is
possible to see whether the markup is pro- or countercyclical. This
latter question centers in a whole separate area of research (e.g.
Schmitt-Grohé (1997), Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), Prince and
Thurik (1992), Bils (1987)).
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been proposed. Oliveira Martins et al. (1996, p.90) argue that an
aggregate variable is not likely to add significant explanatory power
to the regression.’ They choose an industry-specific indicator, just as
Haskel et al. (1995) do. Oliveira Martins et al. use the industry out-
put gap, which relates actual and trend sectoral output, as an indica-
tor of cyclicality.
1 Haskel et al. use several variables related to capac-
ity utilization. From their experiences, it seems save to conclude that




1 Furthermore, they include the cyclical indicator in an ingenious way in order to take into
account the fact that ‘a variable Lerner index has different implications for the primal and
dual Solow residuals.’ (p.90)
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5.1 Introduction
Roeger’s method is applied in this chapter. The empirical results are
based on a panel of annual observations covering 99 three-digit
industries in Dutch Manufacturing in the 1978-1991 period. In view
of confidentiality, the data are combined into 71 clusters. The indus-
tries covered are listed in annex III, which also shows how the clus-
ters relate to industries. The data virtually cover all manufacturing
firms with 20 or more employees. The aggregation level is sufficient-
ly low to obtain relatively homogeneous clusters; the level is the low-
est for which price indices are available. Most of the estimates are at
the two-digit level. Estimates at the three-digit level are only done in
order to check the consistency of estimates at the two levels and to
point out those industries that have extraordinary values for the
Lerner index. Data in respect of price and volume of output is avail-
able, price and volume of labour, material, and capital (although the
data concerning the latter are approximations), as well as data on
capacity utilization. In addition to these industry-specific data, data
on the Gross National Product (GNP) are available for the same peri-
od. Annex IV comprises the definition of the variables and an outline
of data sources.
Most empirical applications of Roeger’s equation use value added
data (cf. p.25). Consequently, material as input factor is excluded. As
discussed in section 4.3, this results in a systematic bias, i.e. the
resulting estimate of the Lerner index is too high. The data set used
here, however, does include data on material. Therefore, both esti-
mates with (section 5.2) and estimates without material (section 5.4)
are presented. This makes it possible to check whether the formula
proposed to correct for this bias, chapter 4 equation (6), holds for
Dutch Manufacturing.
Section 5.2 reports estimates of the basic equation of Roeger’s model
using gross output data. Section 5.3 reports the welfare costs implied
by these estimates. Estimates excluding material are presented in sec-
tion 5.4. Cyclical effects are considered in section 5.5 using an aggre-
gate variable for cyclicality (GNP) as well as a sector-specific variable
(capacity utilization). Section 5.6 reports estimates at the three-digit
level. Section 5.7 concludes the chapter.
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Table 5.1 presents estimates of the basic equation of Roeger’smethod.
The equation estimated is (cf. chapter 4 equation (4)):
Dy = LDx + e
All estimates are significant at (least at) the 5 percent level, except for
SBI-group 23 (clothing). Estimates range from 0.06 to 0.24. For the
significant estimates, R
2
adj ranges from 0.27 to 0.65. The values for the
Durbin-Watson statistic are acceptable (within the boundaries of five
percent significance) except for SBI 32 (construction material) and 39
(miscellaneous). Just as Roeger’s own estimates, these have been cor-
rected for heteroskedasticity (as have the other estimates in this chap-
ter). The average value of the estimates of the Lerner index is 0.11.
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Table 5.1 Results of the Roeger equation at 2 digit level (NMK)
SBI code sector Lerner index t-value R
2
adj DW
20, 21 food processing 0.08 5.27a 0.30 2.08
22 textile 0.10 5.02a 0.43 2.10
23 clothing 0.03 1.25 0.14 2.14
24 leather 0.06 2.88a 0.27 2.19
25 wood and furniture 0.08 6.05a 0.41 1.65
26 paper 0.07 4.42a 0.46 1.85
27 printing 0.12 7.93a 0.65 1.78
29 chemical 0.13 8.15a 0.47 1.81
31 rubber and plastic 0.09 3.76a 0.34 1.93
32 construction material 0.22 8.06a 0.55 1.50
33 basic metal 0.15 3.83a 0.45 1.64
34 fabricated metal products 0.10 9.07a 0.42 1.89
35 machine 0.10 5.02a 0.27 2.15
36 electrical 0.07 3.60a 0.29 2.37
37 transport means 0.09 6.17a 0.35 2.11
39 miscellaneous 0.24 2.84b 0.27 2.74
Significant at the (a) 1 percent level, (b) 5 percent level, (c) 10 percent level. Estimates corrected for heteroskedasticity. NMK: labour,
material, and capital are included.
Comparing the results with previous studies shows that the estimates
assume plausible values.
1 Oliveira Martins et al. (1996) apply
Roeger’s method to 14 OECD countries. Their estimates range from
0.02 to 0.69, although estimates above 0.3 are exceptional. 0.69 is the
estimate for tobacco products in France and is the only estimate that
is larger than 0.44. The average estimate for Dutch Manufacturing
they find is 0.21. However, in case of the Netherlands they only have
1 Almost all studies that are discussed in this chapter report estimates for m. These estimates
are presented here in terms of the Lerner index.
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not fully representative. Schmitt-Grohé (1997, p.111) discusses
various studies and concludes that a value of roughly 0.25 is quite
plausible, whereas values around 0.40 are implausible. All in all,
these results underscore the plausibility of the results found.
1
Table 5.2 Income Shares at 2 digit level
SBI code sector aL aM aK aT
20, 21 food processing 0.16 0.76 0.07 0.99
22 textile 0.26 0.65 0.07 0.99
23 clothing 0.28 0.65 0.05 0.99
24 leather 0.30 0.64 0.05 0.99
25 wood and furniture 0.27 0.66 0.06 0.99
26 paper 0.21 0.68 0.10 0.99
27 printing 0.32 0.57 0.09 0.98
29 chemical 0.19 0.70 0.09 0.98
31 rubber and plastic 0.27 0.63 0.11 1.01
32 construction material 0.30 0.55 0.16 1.01
33 basic metal 0.22 0.69 0.10 1.00
34 fabricated metal products 0.32 0.58 0.08 0.98
35 machine 0.32 0.59 0.08 0.99
36 electrical 0.29 0.64 0.10 1.03
37 transport means 0.26 0.68 0.05 1.00
39 miscellaneous 0.25 0.63 0.05 0.94
average 0.26 0.64 0.08 0.99
The income shares are averages over the period 1979-1991. Data for 1978 are available, but are not
included because they are not used in the estimates reported, since those are based upon TFP-calcula-
tions that use first differences.
Other studies that report gross output estimates are based on Hall’s
method and are not very suitable for purposes of comparison.
Norrbin’s significant estimates in terms of the Lerner index range
from -0.62 to 0.25. He calculates a precision weighted mean, which
equals 0.05. Domowitz et al. (1988) find an interval from 0.2 to 0.53.
The income shares of the industries of Dutch manufacturing are listed
in table 5.2. A sum of income shares of 1 (as for SBI 33 and 37) only
implies CRTS if there is no market power (i.e. q = 0 and L = 0). This
is because only if price equals marginal cost, income shares are iden-
tical to cost shares.
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As explicated in chapter 2, it is possible to relate the Lerner index to
a commonly known measure of static welfare loss, the Harberger tri-
angle. Van Dijk and Van Bergeijk (1997) show that under fairly
restrictive assumptions (i.e. a horizontal marginal cost function and
a linear downward-sloping demand curve) the dead-weight loss can
be expressed in terms of turnover as (chapter 2, equation (11)):
A straightforward application of this formula results in the values
reported in table 5.3.
The assumptions may not be as restrictive as they seem, since they
may hold close to the competitive equilibrium. The formula can be
used as a local estimate of the static welfare loss (cf. Shaffer 1993: 51-
52 for ‘local estimate’ with regard to the conjectural elasticity). If it is
believed that the assumptions only hold close to the competitive
equilibrium, the deviation from perfect competition as measured by
the markup should be small for the local estimate to be a reasonable
one.
The results indicate that the static welfare costs are 6% of turnover.





1 This is not surprising, since the estimates of the mark-ups they use for the calculation do not
include material. However, Van Dijk and Van Bergeijk do not note that their estimates are
overestimating the true mark-up because of this.
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SBI code sector CRTS








31 rubber and plastic 5
32 construction material 11
33 basic metal 8
34 fabricated metal products 5
35 machine 5
36 electrical 4
37 transport means 5
39 miscellaneous 12
average 6
Dead-weight loss as a percentage of revenues.
Calculated from the estimates of table 5.1.
5.4 Estimates Excluding Material
Most papers on TFP-approaches to measuring the size of the markup
use data from national accounts and consequently value added data,
which implies that material is excluded. In order to have estimates at
hand that are comparable to the results of those who use national
accounts data, the same equations have been estimated without
material (table 5.4). As expected, the estimates of the Lerner indices
are much higher: they range from 0.67 to 0.91. The explanatory value
is higher too, as can be gathered from an average R
2
adj of 0.98. All esti-
mates are significant at the 1 percent level. Some of the Durbin-
Watson statistics indicate the presence of serial correlation.
Comparing this to Van Dijk and Van Bergeijk (1997a) shows that
these estimates are high. Their estimates range from 0.17 to 0.53.
There is not even an overlap between their interval and the interval
found here. Their estimates concern Dutch industries, some of which
are in manufacturing. Roeger (1995) reports estimates between 0.13
and 0.68.
Other studies that report value added estimates are based on Hall’s
approach, and are less reliable for purposes of comparison. Haskel et
al. (1995) report estimates from -0.10 to 0.69. Apart from gross out-
37
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These estimates range from 0.15 to 0.72, while the precision weight-
ed mean is 0.32. Shapiro’s (1987a) lowest estimate is 0.21, while the
highest value found is 0.44. Hall’s (1988) significant estimates range
from -9.5 to 0.73.
Overall, the value added estimates found in this report turn out to be
very high and fairly implausible, this in contrast to the gross output
estimates discussed above. Two explanations for this are considered
below.
Apart from the fact that these estimates are comparable to those of
others, they create the opportunity, in combination with the results
presented in the previous section, to investigate the question whether
the formula that has been proposed to derive the correct value of the
markup from the value that has been found using value added data
holds. When output and material grow in strict proportion to each
other, a simple formula has been put forward which can be used to
transform the value added Lerner index – which is an overstatement
of the ‘true’ Lerner index, into the concomitant Lerner index that
would result when material is included. The formula is (chapter 4
equation (6)):
Since the average income share of material in the DUMA database is
0.64, the estimates of table 5.1 should be roughly 0.36 times the esti-
mates reported in table 5.4 below. So, the value added estimates
should be on average 2.78 as high as the ones that include material
(1/0.36 equals 2.78). This, however, is not the case, as can be con-
cluded from a comparison of the L* (1 – a
P
M) column of table 5.4 with
the first column containing Lerner index estimates of table 5.1.
The first question that arises is whether the assumption of strict pro-
portionality holds. This assumption is required for the formula to
apply. Since DUMA2 contains data on Q and M, the correlation
between the two can be calculated. As can be seen in table 5.5, the
average correlation between Q and M is close to 1: 0.97. The assump-
tion of proportionality holds, which would seem to imply that anoth-
er explanation has to be found for the fact that the estimates that
exclude material overestimate the correct value of the Lerner index
even to a greater extent than predicted by the formula. However,
since the estimates are based on first differences, it is relevant to look
at the correlation between the growth of Q and M over time, i.e. DQ
38
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tion is approximately correct for total Q and M, but does not hold for
the yearly growth of these two variables, the correlation of which is
only 0.88 on average. Even when the assumption of fixed proportions




Table 5.4 Estimates based on Value-Added Data
SBI code sector Lerner: L* t-value R
2
adj DW L* (1 – a
P
M) Lerner: L
20, 21 food processing 0.86 73.96a 0.99 2.16 0.21 0.08
22 textile 0.75 43.46a 0.98 1.80 0.26 0.09
23 clothing 0.67 42.63a 0.98 1.87 0.24 0.03
24 leather 0.71 24.92a 0.96 1.84 0.26 0.06
25 wood and furniture 0.74 58.03a 0.98 1.51 0.25 0.08
26 paper 0.77 47.81a 0.99 1.42 0.25 0.07
27 printing 0.72 24.28a 0.97 2.17 0.31 0.12
29 chemical 0.89 82.09a 0.99 1.97 0.27 0.13
31 rubber and plastic 0.74 35.23a 0.97 1.42 0.27 0.09
32 construction material 0.79 52.70a 0.98 1.68 0.36 0.21
33 basic metal 0.87 40.22a 0.99 1.95 0.27 0.15
34 fabricated metal products 0.70 56.87a 0.97 1.86 0.29 0.10
35 machine 0.71 47.68a 0.96 2.00 0.29 0.10
36 electrical 0.74 43.00a 0.98 1.92 0.27 0.07
37 transport means 0.79 37.00a 0.98 1.62 0.25 0.09
39 miscellaneous 0.91 16.79a 0.97 2.29 0.34 0.24
Significant at the (a) 1 percent level, (b) 5 percent level, (c) 10 percent level. Estimates corrected for heteroskedasticity. NK: labour
and capital included; material is excluded. L* indicates that the Lerner index is estimated without taking material into account, which
is likely to result in an overestimate of the true L. Correcting for this using (6) of chapter 4 results in the true value for L if material
and output grow in strict proportion with each other reported in the 7
th column of the table.
These remarks and empirical findings show that using the formula
for correcting for the bias because of the exclusion of material is not
to be recommended without information on the correlation between
growth of output and material. Still, failure of the proportionality
assumption to hold, does not provide for a sufficient explanation. The
divergence between L* (1 – a
P
M) and the gross output estimates of the
Lerner index is too large for it to be a fully satisfactory explanation.
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SBI code sector rQ,M rDQ,DM
20, 21 food processing 0.99 0.78
22 textile 1.00 0.95
23 clothing 1.00 0.97
24 leather 0.83 0.84
25 wood and furniture 1.00 0.96
26 paper 1.00 0.79
27 printing 0.99 0.79
29 chemical 1.00 0.85
31 rubber and plastic 1.00 0.86
32 construction material 1.00 0.87
33 basic metal 1.00 0.91
34 fabricated metal products 0.99 0.89
35 machine 1.00 0.91
36 electrical 0.99 0.83
37 transport means 1.00 0.87
39 miscellaneous 0.74 0.85
average 0.97 0.88
Even when the correlation of the growth of Q and M is considered,
some industries approximate the strict proportionality required for
the formula to hold, such as the ones designated by the SBI codes 22,
23, and 25. The estimate of SBI 23, however, is insignificant. When
the CRTS-estimates that exclude material are translated into what
they are expected to be when material would be included (and the
assumption of strict proportionality holds), 0.26 and 0.25 result for
SBI 22 and 25 respectively (cf. the 7
th column of table 5.4). In con-
trast, the actual estimates that include material are 0.10 and 0.08.
Some of this difference can be explained by the fact that DQ and DM
do not correlate perfectly, as holds even stronger with regard to the
other industries. It seems, however, necessary to explain a residual
divergence of L* (1 – a
P
M) from L.
As discussed above, a possible source of bias are the data on capital.
A small improvement in the data for the quantity and price of capital
is enough to lead to a significant improvement of the fit of the for-
mula for those industries for which the assumption of strict propor-
tionality holds. Since the role of capital is larger than it should be





K = 1– a
MC
N instead of a
MC





a small measurement error in the price or quantity of capital will
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not hold and the possible weaknesses in the data may be able to
explain most of the divergence. However, it is still not fully clear why
the divergence is larger than in comparable cases.
5.5 Cyclical Effects
As discussed in section 4.3, the markup may be cyclical. No prior
expectation is formed about the pro- or counter-cyclicality, because
no consistent picture has emerged from the literature. Looking at the
last two columns of table 5.6, it is easy to see that the data reveal a
clear procyclical development of the markup in case of the estimates
that exclude material (cf. tables AII1 – 4 in annex II). Surprisingly,
both the estimates that use an aggregate indicator of the business
cycle (GNP) and the ones that use a sector-specific indicator (capac-
ity utilization) have similar results. The estimates of the Lerner index
do not change much compared to the results without cyclical effects,
as was the case in Oliveira Martins et al. (1996, p.92).
The results reported that include material are less univocal about the
cyclicality of the markup. Still, all the significant cyclical effects indi-
cate a pro-cyclical behaviour, but only 5 (GNP), and 6 (capacity uti-
lization) estimates are significant. This difference between the num-
ber of industries in which the markup is cyclical in case of the esti-
mates without and the estimates that include material suggests that
those studies that use value-added data and test for cyclicality of the
markup may find results that are an artefact of the exclusion of mate-
rial. Material is probably the most cyclical input, since, in many
cases, it is less fixed than labour and capital. When material is not
taken into account in the estimation process, the parameter of the
cyclical variable that is added is likely to contain a cyclical element
that would be ascribed to material would it have been included.
All in all, these results are broadly similar to those of Prince (1994,
p.32), in which a moderate correlation of 0.50 or 0.63 is found
between the markup and two measures of the business cycle, aggre-
gate sales growth and aggregate capacity utilization.
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GNP, NMK Cap, NMK GNP, NK Cap, NK
SBI code sector Lerner GNP (1) Cap (2) Lerner GNP (1) Cap (2)
20, 21 food processing 0.08 0.27 0.33 0.87 0.38 0.49
22 textile 0.11 0.55 0.77 0.76 0.63 0.88
23 clothing 0.68
24 leather 0.07 0.73 0.60 0.83
25 wood and furniture 0.08 0.75 0.36 0.52
26 paper 0.08 0.78 0.42 0.56
27 printing 0.13 0.72
29 chemical 0.13 0.89 0.71 0.94
31 rubber and plastic 0.11 0.55 0.72 0.77 0.77 0.10
32 construction material 0.23 0.88 0.12 0.80 0.92 0.12
33 basic metal 0.15 0.88
34 fabricated metal products 0.10 0.35 0.52 0.71 0.60 0.87
35 machine 0.10 0.72 0.42 0.59
36 electrical 0.06 0.74
37 transport means 0.10 0.80 0.73 0.10
39 miscellaneous 0.24 0.29 0.90
This table summarizes the information of tables AI1-4 in Annex I. All reported estimates are significant (at least) at the 5 percent level.
Less significant estimates are reported in the source tables. Estimates include either labour, material, and capital (NMK), or labour and
capital, but no material (NK). Estimates are corrected for heteroskedasticity. CRTS: constant returns to scale is assumed (i.e. capital
share is determined indirectly). GNP: Gross National Product. Cap: capacity utilization. Lerner-columns depict estimates of the Lerner
index. Almost all estimates of the Lerner index for Cap are identical to those for GNP when rounded of at two decimals and are report-
ed only once for NMK and once for NK. 
(1) Actual estimates equal reported values*E-02. 
(2) Actual estimates equal reported values*E-04.
5.6 Estimates at the Three-Digit Level
The basic equation has been estimated at the three-digit level as well.
The results are fully consistent with the results at the two-digit level.
This is to be expected, since both are based on the same data.
However, combining several three-digit industries to construct data
for a two-digit industry is only warranted when the industries are
sufficiently homogeneous. Ex post evaluation of the estimates can
provide some evidence for this, if only because of the fact that too
much heterogeneity may lead to insignificant estimates at the two-
digit level. The results for the individual industries can be found in
annex II, table AII5.
That the two-digit and the three-digit estimates are consistent with
one another follows from the fact that the average estimates of the
three-digit industries that are part of the same two-digit industry is
close to the estimate for that two-digit group. For instance, in respect
to the two-digit industry 29 (chemical) that comprises the three-digit
industries numbered 29-37,
1 the two-digit estimate of the Lerner
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numbering of the DUMA-industries does not parallel the SBI-classification. See annex IV for
a list of DUMA-three-digit industries and the respective SBI code-numbers. DUMA industries
are labelled DUMA clusters, since the DUMA classification sometimes combines a couple of
SBI three-digit industries.
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estimates (8 out of 9) is 0.12. With regard to SBI 33 comprising
DUMA clusters 46 and 47, the three-digit estimates widely diverge:
the Lerner indices that are found have as their values 0.21 and 0.09
respectively. Still, the two-digit estimate equals the average of these
two three-digit industries: 0.15.
In table 5.7, the results at the three-digit level are presented. Only the
five highest and the five lowest estimates are included. The three-
digit estimates are consistent with the two-digit estimates, since the
average of the three-digit industry estimates corresponds to the esti-
mate at the two-digit level.
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Table 5.7 Estimate at 3 digit level (CRTS, NMK)
DUMA Lerner
Cluster SBI-code sector index
40 321 Manufacture of bricks and tiles 0.30
42 323 Manufacture of sand lime bricks 0.24
71 394 Manufacture of toys and sports goods 0.24
46 331 & 332 & 334 Iron and steel industry; Manufacture of steel tubes; 
Non-ferrous metal industry 0.21
56 349 Forges, surface treatment etc. 0.20
9 213 Manufacture of other food products 0.06
24 261 & 262 Paper and cardboard industry; Paperware industry 0.06
59 353 Manufacture of machinery for food processing, 
chemical and related industries 0.04
1 201 Slaughtering and meat processing industry 0.03
2 202 & 204 &206 Dairy and dairy products industry; Flour mills, 
groats and rice husking; mills etc.; 
Manufacture of margarine and other vegetable and 
animal oils and fats 0.03
This table is based on table AI5 in Annex I. All reported estimates are significant at (at least) the 5 percent level. CRTS:
constant returns to scale is assumed. NMK: labour, material, and capital included. The first five reported estimates are
the five highest, while the last five estimates represent the five lowest estimates.
The two highest estimates, DUMA clusters 40 and 42, both belong to
the two-digit industry 32 (construction material). The value of the
Lerner index equals 0.30 and 0.24 respectively. Other industries with
high estimated Lerner indices are 71 – which is identical to SBI 39 in
the DUMA dataset since that dataset only contains one three-digit
industry belonging to that two-digit industry –, 46 (SBI 33, basic
metal), and 56 (SBI 34, fabricated metal products), with respective
values of 0.24, 0.21, and 0.20 for the Lerner index.
The first two three-digit clusters – the 2
nd of which comprises 3 three-
digit industries due to data availability – of SBI 20 & 21 (food pro-
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estimate found. The manufacture of machinery, among other things
for food processing (number 59), has a low estimated Lerner index
as well: 0.04. The manufacture of other food products (DUMA clus-
ter 9) and parts of the paper-related industry (DUMA cluster 24) have
an estimated Lerner index of 0.06.
For a first impression of the magnitude of the non-competitive rents
in Dutch Manufacturing estimates at the two-digit level suffice.
However, as can be gathered from the results presented in table 5.7
discussed in this section, one cannot generalize from estimates at the
two-digit level to the situation at the three-digit level. Therefore, esti-
mates at the three-digit (or DUMA cluster) level are worthwhile. No
unexpected things have come up while investigating the three-digit
results. One problem that arises is that the number of observations is
lower at the three-digit level when panel data are used at the two-digit
level. It is not surprising then that 17 out of the 71 DUMA clusters
have insignificant estimates, whereas in the parallel case at the two-
digit level only 1 out of 16 estimates was insignificant.
5.7 Conclusion
Based on gross output-based estimates, it can be concluded that the
average value of the Lerner index in Dutch manufacturing is 0.11.
These estimates imply a welfare loss of 6 percent.
Some subsidiary conclusions can be drawn from the various results
that have been reported. Using the transformation equation to draw
conclusions about the gross output markup from estimates of the
value added markup is not to be advised. First of all, the assumption
of strict proportionality is not valid in all cases. Secondly, the effects
of mismeasurement of the price and/or volume of capital are larger
when material has not been taken into account. Apart from these two
factors there may be other disturbing factors that are needed to
account for the large difference between the gross output and value
added estimates found here.
The markup in Dutch Manufacturing is procyclical in roughly 6
industries. The markups of other industries do not exhibit a patterned
behaviour which is related to the business cycle. Both an aggregate
and a industry-specific indicator of cyclicality have been used.
Though the industry-specific indicator is slightly more successful, the
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Pricing and quantity-setting policies as aspects of market power have
been the focus of this report. An oligopoly model has been presented
in chapter 2. It was used to show how the Lerner index, as a measure
of non-competitive rents, and the conjectural elasticity, as an index of
market power, relate to one another. Conceptually, they stand for per-
formance and conduct respectively. In the two following chapters,
models have been presented that can be used for estimating the
Lerner index. Some of these models contain the conjectural elasticity
as well. All these models are part of the New Empirical Industrial
Organization.
Chapter 3 discusses the models proposed by Bresnahan (1982) and
Appelbaum (1982). Both models contain a supply relation and a
demand curve. A special feature of Bresnahan’s model is that its
demand equation contains a variable that rotates the demand curve.
Appelbaum’s model contains three factor demand equations that are
used to provide cross-equation restrictions with the supply relation.
Both these models contain the conjectural elasticity as a variable. The
Lerner index can be calculated from the estimated model.
Chapter 4 discusses the model proposed by Roeger (1995). This
method does not presuppose a specific parametric structure for pro-
duction or cost, although it does assume constant returns to scale.
The use of value added or gross output data is discussed, as well as
the potentially cyclical behaviour of the markup. The model contains
the Lerner index as a variable to be estimated, but does not contain
the conjectural elasticity.
Roeger’s method is subsequently applied to Dutch manufacturing in
chapter 5. Both gross output and value added estimates are present-
ed. It is concluded that gross output estimates are to be preferred,
since the transformation equation is not always reliable. Gross output
estimates are presented both at the two and the three-digit level. The
estimated values of the Lerner index range from 0.03 to 0.30. The aver-
age value is 0.11. The welfare effects of the estimated non-competitive
rents are examined. The welfare costs amount to 6 per cent of total
revenue on average. Finally, the cyclical behaviour of the markup is
investigated. The markup is found to be procyclical in 5 or 6 indus-
tries, depending on whether an aggregate or an industry-specific indi-
cator of the business cycle is used. The overall conclusion is that the
non-competitive rents in Dutch manufacturing are fairly moderate.
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Annex I Identities and Derivations
Identities
Price, marginal cost, and markups
(i)
(ii)
From (i) and (ii) the following identities can be derived:
(iiia)
(iiib)
Cost and income shares
(iv)
(v)






Total and average cost
(vii)
(viii)
Constant returns to scale
(ix) AC = MC
(x) and (xi) are implications of (ix):
(x)
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How equations (x) and (xi) are implied by (ix) can be shown as
follows:
ad (x): equation (ix) formally comes down to 
This implies: 
ad (xi): according to (vi) and (x),
Because of (iiib), this leads to:
Derivations
Starting from:
(AI1) (cf. chapter 4 equation (2))
equation (3) of chapter 4 can be derived by formulating (AI1) in








Annex I: Identities and Derivations





Equation (4) of chapter 4 results if the derivatives are approximated
using first differences.
1
1 If the returns to scale are not assumed to be constant, L in (AI10) should be replaced by
where l measures the returns to scale and is assumed to be invariant over time. The under-
lying cost function is
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Annex II Empirical Results
Source Tables of Table 5.6
• Table AII1: Results of the Roeger equation at 2 digit level (GNP,
NMK).
• Table AII2: Results of the Roeger equation at 2 digit level (Cap,
NMK).
• Table AII3: Results of the Roeger equation at 2 digit level (GNP,
NK).
• Table AII4: Results of the Roeger equation at 2 digit level (Cap,
NK).
Symbols between brackets are explained beneath the tables.
Table AII-1 Results of the Roeger equation at 2 digit level (CRTS, GNP, NMK)
SBI code sector Lerner index t-value GNP t-value R
2
adj DW
20, 21 food processing 0.08 5.37a 0.27E-02 1.95b 0.30 2.16
22 textile 0.11 5.46a 0.55E-02 2.43b 0.41 2.29
23 clothing 0.03 1.42c 0.18E-02 0.91 0.10 2.19
24 leather 0.07 2.80a 0.32E-02 0.96 0.24 2.27
25 wood and furniture 0.08 6.53a 0.18E-02 1.10 0.39 1.71
26 paper 0.08 5.19a 0.30E-02 1.64c 0.44 1.95
27 printing 0.13 7.80a 0.19E-02 0.91 0.64 1.89
29 chemical 0.13 8.18a 0.29E-02 1.10 0.47 1.84
31 rubber and plastic 0.11 4.91a 0.55E-02 1.96b 0.31 2.01
32 construction material 0.23 8.93a 0.88E-02 2.80a 0.54 1.70
33 basic metal 0.15 3.78a 0.13E-02 0.25 0.43 1.64
34 fabricated metal products 0.10 9.58a 0.35E-02 2.43b 0.41 2.00
35 machine 0.10 4.66a 0.14E-02 0.58 0.26 2.17
36 electrical 0.06 3.32a -0.12E-02 -0.30 0.23 2.33
37 transport means 0.10 6.46a 0.36E-02 1.54c 0.34 2.19
39 miscellaneous 0.24 2.77a 0.19E-02 0.12 0.21 2.74
Significant at the (a) 1 percent level, (b) 5 percent level, (c) 10 percent level. Estimates corrected for heteroskedasticity. GNP: Gross
National Product is included as cyclical variable. NMK: labour, material, and capital included.
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Table AII-2 Results of the Roeger equation at 2 digit level (Cap, NMK)
SBI code sector Lerner index t-value GNP t-value R
2
adj DW
20, 21 food processing 0.08 5.35a 0.33E-04 1.86b 0.30 2.16
22 textile 0.11 5.51a 0.77E-04 2.56b 0.42 2.32
23 clothing 0.03 1.44c 0.24E-04 0.91 0.10 2.19
24 leather 0.07 2.79a 0.40E-04 0.92 0.24 2.25
25 wood and furniture 0.08 6.59a 0.27E-04 1.25 0.40 1.72
26 paper 0.08 5.32a 0.27E-04 1.19 0.44 1.95
27 printing 0.13 7.84a 0.25E-04 0.94 0.64 1.89
29 chemical 0.13 8.18a 0.42E-04 1.24 0.46 1.84
31 rubber and plastic 0.11 4.91a 0.72E-04 1.85b 0.31 2.01
32 construction material 0.23 8.88a 0.12E-03 2.75a 0.54 1.69
33 basic metal 0.15 3.80a 0.18E-04 0.24 0.43 1.64
34 fabricated metal pro ducts 0.10 9.59a 0.52E-04 2.56b 0.41 2.01
35 machine 0.10 4.67a 0.22E-04 0.71 0.26 2.17
36 electrical 0.07 3.37a -0.12E-04 -0.21 0.23 2.33
37 transport means 0.10 6.49a 0.48E-04 1.50c 0.34 2.19
39 miscellaneous 0.24 2.80a 0.29E-06 0.18b 0.21 2.75
Significant at the (a) 1 percent level, (b) 5 percent level, (c) 10 percent level. Estimates corrected for heteroskedasticity. Cap: capaci-
ty utilization included as cyclical variable. NMK: labour, material, and capital included.
Table AII-3 Results of the Roeger equation at 2 digit level (GNP, NK)
SBI code sector Lerner index t-value GNP t-value R
2
adj DW
20, 21 food processing 0.87 71.07a 0.38E-02 3.49a 0.99 2.34
22 textile 0.76 46.02a 0.63E-02 3.19a 0.98 2.11
23 clothing 0.68 45.68a 0.20E-02 1.05 0.98 1.86
24 leather 0.73 24.73a 0.60E-02 1.93b 0.96 2.06
25 wood and furniture 0.75 56.63a 0.36E-02 2.05b 0.98 1.64
26 paper 0.78 45.96a 0.42E-02 2.52a 0.99 1.75
27 printing 0.72 24.23a 0.40E-02 1.58c 0.98 2.33
29 chemical 0.89 86.37a 0.71E-02 4.44a 0.99 2.34
31 rubber and plastic 0.77 35.73a 0.77E-02 2.70a 0.97 1.61
32 construction material 0.80 52.39a 0.92E-02 3.48a 0.97 2.05
33 basic metal 0.88 41.05a 0.38E-02 1.18 0.99 2.10
34 fabricated metal products 0.71 56.16a 0.60E-02 4.33a 0.97 2.10
35 machine 0.72 39.35a 0.42E-02 1.90b 0.96 2.12
36 electrical 0.74 36.66a 0.26E-02 0.55 0.98 2.07
37 transport means 0.80 36.75a 0.73E-02 3.49a 0.98 1.78
39 miscellaneous 0.90 16.73a 0.79E-02 0.96 0.97 2.42
Significant at the (a) 1 percent level, (b) 5 percent level, (c) 10 percent level. Estimates corrected for heteroskedasticity. GNP: Gross
National Product included as cyclical variable. NK: labour and capital included; material is excluded.
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Table AII-4: Results of the Roeger equation at 2 digit level (Cap, NK)
SBI code sector Lerner index t-value GNP t-value R
2
adj DW
20, 21 food processing 0.87 70.91a 0.49E-04 3.41a 0.99 2.34
22 textile 0.76 46.42a 0.88E-04 3.38a 0.98 2.14
23 clothing 0.68 45.83a 0.27E-04 1.06 0.98 1.86
24 leather 0.73 24.78a 0.83E-04 1.98b 0.96 2.07
25 wood and furniture 0.75 56.88a 0.52E-04 2.31b 0.98 1.66
26 paper 0.78 46.34a 0.56E-04 2.74a 0.99 1.81
27 printing 0.73 24.24a 0.54E-04 1.65c 0.97 2.34
29 chemical 0.89 86.31a 0.94E-04 4.53a 0.99 2.34
31 rubber and plastic 0.77 35.73a 0.10E-03 2.71a 0.97 1.62
32 construction material 0.80 52.29a 0.12E-03 3.45a 0.97 2.04
33 basic metal 0.87 41.65a 0.56E-04 1.19 0.99 2.08
34 fabricated metal products 0.71 56.31a 0.87E-04 4.54a 0.97 2.11
35 machine 0.72 39.34a 0.59E-04 2.01b 0.96 2.13
36 electrical 0.75 36.97a 0.42E-04 0.63 0.98 2.11
37 transport means 0.80 36.76a 0.10E-03 3.61a 0.98 1.79
39 miscellaneous 0.91 17.07a 0.95E-06 1.11 0.97 2.46
Significant at the (a) 1 percent level, (b) 5 percent level, (c) 10 percent level. Estimates corrected for heteroskedasticity. Cap: capaci-
ty utilization included as cyclical variable. NK: labour and capital included; material is excluded.
Source Table for Table 5.7
Table AII-5 Roeger at 3 digit level (NMK)
cluster Lerner-index t-value R
2
adj DW
1 0.03 2.55b 0.25 2.24
2 0.03 2.20b 0.31 2.36
3 0.03 0.87 0.04 2.93
4 0.14 4.25a 0.61 1.95
5 0.09 5.26a 0.50 1.49
6 0.07 4.07a 0.57 0.88
7 0.00 0.03 0.00 2.26
8 0.03 1.93c 0.06 2.58
9 0.06 3.76a 0.32 2.01
10 0.15 3.41a 0.56 2.62
11 0.18 4.79a 0.71 1.56
12 0.04 1.07 0.20 2.55
13 0.10 4.05a 0.50 1.84
14 0.07 3.38a 0.47 1.16
15 0.14 4.98a 0.57 2.16
16 -0.02 -1.36 0.10 1.57
17 0.04 1.83c 0.32 2.23
18 0.04 1.60 0.13 2.12
19 0.08 2.89b 0.57 2.38
20 0.05 1.73 0.17 1.77
21 0.07 0.07 0.29 1.33
22 0.09 3.04b 0.48 1.88
23 0.09 5.44a 0.74 1.01
24 0.06 2.96b 0.48 1.09
25 0.10 3.60a 0.52 2.78
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cluster Lerner-index t-value R
2
adj DW
26 0.10 4.57a 0.65 1.47
27 0.13 6.91a 0.79 1.53
28 0.13 3.54a 0.53 2.03
29 0.15 3.89a 0.64 1.98
30 0.11 3.28a 0.41 1.80
31 0.16 4.32a 0.76 1.65
32 0.18 3.92a 0.47 1.26
33 0.09 5.22a 0.66 1.72
34 0.09 1.92c 0.16 1.05
35 0.10 11.05a 0.69 1.87
36 0.08 2.60b 0.26 2.35
37 0.10 2.92b 0.29 2.38
38 0.09 1.47 0.26 1.98
39 0.10 7.67a 0.73 1.89
40 0.30 6.00a 0.68 1.17
41 0.16 0.16 0.39 2.16
42 0.24 6.40a 0.56 1.83
43 0.18 4.84a 0.67 1.91
44 0.15 6.82a 0.53 1.91
45 0.12 3.83a 0.50 1.64
46 0.21 3.92a 0.53 1.45
47 0.09 4.59a 0.46 1.95
48 0.06 1.94c 0.37 1.29
49 0.11 3.51a 0.37 2.50
50 0.12 4.26a 0.56 2.10
51 0.05 2.10c 0.18 1.95
52 0.07 6.23a 0.48 2.34
53 0.10 2.96b 0.40 1.24
54 0.08 3.52a 0.38 2.92
55 0.08 6.65a 0.49 1.41
56 0.20 6.71a 0.68 2.01
57 0.10 2.82b 0.20 2.12
58 0.19 7.47a 0.73 1.55
59 0.04 3.22a 0.19 1.65
60 0.11 3.84a 0.57 1.98
61 0.16 3.14a 0.41 1.98
62 0.14 3.69a 0.40 2.11
63 0.03 0.72 0.04 2.35
64 0.10 1.80c 0.25 2.72
65 0.07 3.60a 0.29 2.36
66 0.11 2.29b 0.17 1.77
67 0.06 5.64a 0.45 2.39
68 0.04 0.75 0.05 2.54
69 0.16 7.22a 0.79 1.71
70 0.10 4.62a 0.70 1.55
71 0.24 2.84b 0.27 2.74
Significant at the a 1 percent level; b 5 percent level;
c 10 percent level. Estimates corrected for heteroskedasticity.
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Annex III Description of Industries
The data set includes observations for 71 clusters in Dutch manufac-
turing (1978-1991). A cluster equals a three-digit industry as defined
in the SBI code or a combination thereof. The description of these
industries are given below.
Cluster SBI-code description
1 201 Slaughtering and meat processing industry
2 202+ Dairy and dairy products industry
204+ Flour mills, groats and rice husking mills etc.
206 Manufacture of margarine and other vegetable and animal oils and
fats
3 203 Fish processing plants
4 205+ Sugar refinery plants
211 Starch and starch derivatives industry
5 207 Canning, preserving and processing of fruits and vegetables
6 208 Manufacture of bread, rusks, pastries, cakes and biscuits
7 209 Manufacture of cocoa, chocolate and confectionery
8 212 Manufacture of compounded animal stock feeds
9 213 Manufacture of other food products
10 214 Alcohol manufacturing and distilleries
11 215+ Breweries and malt houses
216+ Non-alcoholic beverages
217 Tobacco processing industry
12 221+ Wool industry
222+ Cotton industry
224 Textile refinement industry
13 223 Knitting and hosiery industry
14 225+ Manufacture of carpets and rugs
226+ Linoleum and felt/canvas industry
229 Other textile industry
15 227 Textile wares industry (excl. garments)
16 231+ Manufacture of ready-made clothing
232 Contract manufacture of ready-made clothing
17 233+ Manufacture of tailor-made garments
234+ Furrieries and fur processing plants
235 Milliners, hatters and manufacture of fashion goods
18 241+ Leather industry
242 Leatherware industry (excl. clothing)
19 243 Footwear industry
20 251+ Sawmills, timber planing plants etc.
252+ Plywood, veneer, fibre, chipboard and wood preservation industry
255+ Manufacture of other wooden articles
256 Cork, braiding and bristle industry
21 253 Carpeting, parquetry industry
22 254 Manufacture of wooden containers
23 257 Furniture industry (excl. metal furniture)
24 261+ Paper and cardboard industry
262 Paperware industry
25 263 Corrugated cardboard and cardboard industry
26 271 Printing industry
27 272 Publishing industry
28 273 Bookbinding industry
29 291 Manufacture of fertilizers
30 292 Manufacture of plastics
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Cluster SBI-code description
31 293 Manufacture of dye stuffs and pigments
32 294+ Other chemical raw materials industry
300 Manufacture of artificial and synthetic yarns and fibres
33 295 Manufacture of paint, lacquer, varnish and printing ink
34 296 Manufacture of pharmaceutical and antiseptic dressings
35 297 Manufacture of soap; other washing and cleaning materials, per-
fumes and cosmetics
36 298 Manufacture of chemical detergents etc.
37 299 Manufacture of other chemical products
38 311+ Rubber processing industry
312 Re-treading industry
39 313 Plastic processing industry
40 321 Manufacture of bricks and tiles
41 322 Manufacture of earthenware
42 323 Manufacture of sand lime bricks
43 324+ Cement and limestone industry
327 Manufacture of other minerals
44 325 Manufacture of concrete and cement products
45 328 Manufacture of glass and glass processing plants
46 331+ Iron and steel industry
332+ Manufacture of steel tubes
334 Non-ferrous metal industry
47 333 Wire drawing and cold rolling industry
48 340 Foundries
49 341 Iron works, crushing and pressing industry
50 342 Manufacture of screws, mass products from lathes and springs
51 343 Construction of tanks, reservoirs and pipelines
52 344 Other metal construction
53 345 Manufacture of metal furniture
54 346+ Metal packaging industry
347 Manufacture of heating and cooking apparatus (excl. electric)
55 348 Manufacture of other metal products
56 349 Forges, surface treatment etc.
57 351 Manufacture of agricultural machinery
58 352 Manufacture of metal working machinery
59 353 Manufacture of machinery for food processing, chemical and relat-
ed industries
60 354 Lifting and other transport equipment for mining, construction,
building materials and metallurgic industries
61 355 Manufacture of cog wheels, bearings and other driving gear
62 356 Manufacture of machinery and other equipment for industries
n.e.s.
63 357 Manufacture of steamboilers, engines and turbines
64 358+ Manufacture of office machinery
359 Manufacture of other machinery and apparatus
65 361+ Electric cable and wire industry
362+ Electric engines, generators, transformers, switchgear and instal-
lation materials industry
369 Other electrotechnical industry
66 371+ Manufacture and assembly of automobiles
373+ Manufacture of car parts
377 Aircraft construction and repair industry
67 372 Manufacture of coach work and trailers
68 374 Shipbuilding and ship repair industries
69 376 Manufacture of bicycles and motorcycles
70 379 Manufacture of other transport equipment
71 394 Manufacture of toys and sports goods
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and Data Sources
The data for manufacturing (1978-1991) have mainly been taken
from the DUMA2 data compilation set up by EIM. DUMA is an abbre-
viation of DUtch MAnufacturing. The data are based on the
“Productiestatistieken Industrie” and the “Maandstatistiek van de
Prijzen” of Statistics Netherlands. The industry-specific data pertain
to firms with 20 or more employees. It consists of 71 three-digit indus-
try clusters. Of these, several groups are combinations of two or more
three-digit industries (a total of 99) according tothe SBI classification
(a description of the industry groups is included in annex V).
p output price index adjusted for taxes and subsidies; DUMA2
Q volume of output, calculated from DUMA2
N employment as per September 30; DUMA2
w(n) labour cost per employee; DUMA2
M volume of purchased raw materials, semi-finished goods and
additives; DUMA2
w(m) price index of Mi; DUMA2
K stock of capital; defined jointly with price of capital
w(k) price of capital; defined jointly with K. Depreciating the tan-
gible assets from the DUMA2 file forms the basis for the volume com-
ponent K. This depreciation is then divided by the depreciation frac-
tion d to determine the value of the capital goods stocks. We are
assuming exponential depreciation here, since a certain fraction of
existing capital goods stocks are depreciated each year. The depreci-
ation fraction d is a weighting average of the depreciation fractions
per type of goods. The data came from the “Life Expectancy Data
Bank” of the Main Department of Statistics for Capital Goods Stocks
and Balances of CBS.
1 The resulting capital goods stock is expressed
in current prices. Since we are looking for a capital goods stock in
constant prices (volume terms), it is divided by an investment price
for the entire economy (source: National Accounts – CBS). This price
63
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1 The data are reported in Van Leeuwen (1993).
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investments). The resulting capital goods stock is the variable K.
Unit: millions of Dutch guilders, constant price level. The price com-
ponent of the capital cost wK represents a consumer price and is cal-
culated as follows (t is a time index): wK,t = (rt + d) pt – D pt (cost
of financing and depreciation less capital gain). Long-term interest
plus 2 percent was used for r (surcharge for business risks. Long-term
interest comes from CEP, CPB). The symbol prepresents the invest-
ment price described above. The variable wK is expressed in percent-
age points. Because of the construction of this variable, the series
wKdoes not differ among the various industry groups. By multiplying
the variables K and w(k) with each other, the result is the current cost
of capital.
GNP Gross National Product; DUMA2
Pim price index of import goods according to SGN-classification,
which closely parallels the SBI-classification used for the other vari-
ables. This variable is not available for all 71 DUMA clusters, since it
does not belong to the original data set. Furthermore, data are avail-
able for the 1980-1991 period. When this variable is used, the num-
ber of three-digit clusters available decreases, as well as does the
number of observations within each three-digit industry.
Cap capacity utilization at the two-digit level SBI; a time series of
a certain two-digit industry is paired with all DUMA-clusters belong-
ing to that two-digit industry.
Conc C4 concentration ratio; defined as the number of employees
of the largest four firms in the industry divided by total employment
64
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List of Research Reports
The research report series is the successor of both the research paper
and the ‘researchpublikatie’ series. There is a consecutive report
numbering followed by /x. For /x there are five options:
/E: a report of the department of Strategic Research, written in
English;
/N: like /E, but written in Dutch;
/F: like /E, but written in French;
/A: a report of one of the other departments of the Research
Institute for Small and Medium-sized Business;
/I: a report of the department of Strategic Research for internal
purposes; external availability on request.
9301/E The intertemporal stability of the concentration-margins rela-
tionship in Dutch and U.S. manufacturing; Yvonne Prince
and Roy Thurik
9302/E Persistence of profits and competitiveness in Dutch manu-
facturing; Aad Kleijweg
9303/E Small store presence in Japan; Martin A. Carree, Jeroen C.A.
Potjes and A. Roy Thurik
9304/I Multi-factorial risk analysis and the sensitivity concept; Erik
M. Vermeulen, Jaap Spronk and Nico van der Wijst
9305/E Do small firms’ price-cost margins follow those of large
firms? First empirical results; Yvonne Prince and Roy Thurik
9306/A Export success of SMEs: an empirical study; Cinzia Mancini
and Yvonne Prince
9307/N Het aandeel van het midden- en kleinbedrijf in de
Nederlandse industrie; Kees Bakker en Roy Thurik
9308/E Multi-factorial risk analysis applied to firm evaluation; Erik
M. Vermeulen, Jaap Spronk and Nico van der Wijst
9309/E Visualizing interfirm comparison; Erik M. Vermeulen, Jaap
Spronk and Nico van der Wijst
9310/E Industry dynamics and small firm development in the
European printing industry (Case Studies of Britain, The
Netherlands and Denmark); Michael Kitson, Yvonne Prince
and Mette Mönsted
9401/E Employment during the business cycle: evidence from Dutch
manufacturing; Marcel H.C. Lever en Wilbert H.M. van der
Hoeven
9402/N De Nederlandse industrie in internationaal perspectief: arbei-
dsproduktiviteit, lonen en concurrentiepositie; Aad Kleijweg
en Sjaak Vollebregt
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9403/E A micro-econometric analysis of interrelated factor demand;
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